RSA
Quantum-vulnerable public-key mechanism requiring transition planning.
Why it matters
Timeline uncertainty does not remove the need to prepare.
Cryptographically relevant quantum computers do not exist today at the scale required to break widely deployed public-key cryptography, and the future timeline remains uncertain. Risk management should not build its programme around guessing a date.
The actionable question is whether important data and services depend on public-key cryptography that will require replacement — and whether the organisation has enough lead time to discover, prioritise, test and migrate those dependencies.
Risk lens
Quantum risk is partly a future threat problem. Quantum readiness is a present-day dependency, governance and change-management problem.
What changes
Not all cryptography is affected in the same way.
Elliptic-curve cryptography
ECC-based signatures and key establishment also require transition planning.
Symmetric cryptography
Quantum impact differs from RSA and ECC; current guidance and appropriate key strengths remain relevant.
Hash functions
Hashing is affected differently; organisations should follow applicable standards rather than treating all cryptography as equally vulnerable.
What to prepare
Move from awareness to controlled transition.
01DiscoverIdentify quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography.
02ContextualiseConnect findings to criticality, data lifetime, owners and dependencies.
03PrioritiseCombine exposure, consequence, migration complexity and lead time.
04GovernSet ownership, standards, risk decisions and reporting.
05Plan & migrateCoordinate suppliers, testing, interoperability and technology refresh.
06Sustain agilityUse this transition to make future change easier.
Current standards
PQC is no longer only a research topic.
NIST published its first three final PQC standards in August 2024: FIPS 203 for ML-KEM key establishment, and FIPS 204 and FIPS 205 for ML-DSA and SLH-DSA digital signatures. Migration governance should distinguish final standards from algorithms, profiles and integrations still evolving.
ML-KEM
Module-lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism.
ML-DSA
Module-lattice-based digital signature standard.
SLH-DSA
Stateless hash-based digital signature standard.
Ecosystem integration
Products, protocols and additional standards continue to evolve; readiness requires controlled adoption, not algorithm chasing.
What good governance looks like
Readiness is evidenced through ownership, visibility and a risk-based roadmap.
Programme ownershipClear accountability across security, architecture, technology, risk, procurement and business ownership.
Cryptographic inventoryQuantum-vulnerable use is linked to purpose, location, owner and dependencies.
Business & data contextCriticality, sensitivity, protection lifetime and exposure inform priority.
Migration roadmapPlans align to standards, refresh cycles, supplier capability and testing windows.
Supplier engagementCritical vendors provide evidence on support, timelines and constraints.
Progress & residual riskBlockers, exceptions and decisions are visible to leadership.
Prioritisation principle
Prioritise by exposure, protection lifetime, business consequence and migration difficulty — not fear or a speculative quantum date.
What to do next
Start with decisions that are useful even if the timeline changes.
Identify vulnerable public-key useFocus first on critical services and long-lived sensitive data.
Map migration blockersFind embedded, hardware-bound, protocol and supplier-controlled dependencies.
Engage strategic suppliersRequest credible PQC support and interoperability roadmaps.
Align technology refreshAvoid buying or extending long-lived dependencies that create unnecessary migration debt.
Build crypto-agilityUse PQC preparation to make the next cryptographic transition less disruptive.
The resilience view
Quantum readiness is an outcome of good cryptography governance.
An organisation that can discover cryptography, understand dependencies, assign ownership, prioritise risk and execute controlled change already has much of the capability required for PQC migration.
The goal is not simply to become “post-quantum compliant.” It is to become resilient enough to manage this transition — and the transitions that follow it.
Authoritative sources
Further reading
NISTPost-Quantum Cryptography ProjectNIST NCCoEMigration to Post-Quantum CryptographyNIST NCCoEMigration to PQC FAQENISAPQC Integration Study
Quantum-computing timelines remain uncertain. This page focuses on risk-based preparedness and current public standards.